Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 2

1930

Equity as a Concept of International Law (continued)
Lester Bernhardt Orfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the International Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Orfield, Lester Bernhardt (1930) "Equity as a Concept of International Law (continued)," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 18: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol18/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

EQUITY AS A CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*

B. EQuiTy AS

INTFTPRE

D

in ARmiTRAL AwARDs

Beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794 the United. States
has during the whole period of its history been drafting arbitral
agreements in which equity is made a part of the material
applicable law. In a number of cases arising under such agreements the precise meaning of the term has been brought in issue.
The earliest case in which the question was raised seems to have
been the Florida Bonds case decided by the British-American
Claims Commission under the Treaty of 1853.104 The claim
of England to recover for debts contracted by the territorial
government of Florida was rejected. Thomas, the American
agent, in his argument asked to what kind. of equity the British
counsel referred when he placed his claim "upon the principles
of equity, reason and public morals." He must be alluding to
a "transcendental equity which belongs not to man to administer." If it were a legal equity the claims should have
been brought before the American courts. The claimants admit
that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction. "The
equity, then demanded, is that which has heretofore been too
subtle for courts of justice, and the case is brought before this
Commission under the supposition that it is endowed with superhuman power."
The Rio Grande cases decided in 1873 by the BritishAmerican Claims Commission is notable for the protest of Commissioner Frasier against a broad interpretation of the term
"equity".105 "The doctrine that this commission may by its
decisions, disregard the law of nations, in deference to whatever
undefined notions of 'equity and justice' the several members
of the commission may happen to entertain from time to time,
is to me a very great surprise." Equity does not depend on the
individual conscience of the chancellor; " 'equity follows the
law'--abides by it-not only obeys but maintains it, and administers justice according to a system of known and established
* The first installment of this article appeared in the November
issue of the Kentucky Law Journal.
-eport of the British,American Claim Commission under Treaty
of 1853, 246, 269.

"1'3ForeignRelations of 1873, Vol. 2, Hale's Report on British,
American Claims Commission, pp. 246, 247.
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principles sanctioned by precedent." The rules of international
law furnish the full measure of obligation in a given case, and
ascertain what equity is. The agent for Great Britain argued
that the arbitration agreement vested the tribunal with an extraordinary discretion since only equity and justice are mentioned as the juridical bases without any reference to international law. 10 6 The Jay Treaty gave more limited power
since international law was expressly laid down as a ground of
decision. Irrespective of international law the claims must be
satisfied if "justified in the conscientious judgment of the commissioners by justice and equity." Equity should therefore refuse to follow the technical rule of prize law that probable cause
not merely excuses, but in some cases justifies a capture. If,
however, the rule of probable cause were to be adopted, the
tribunal should work out its own doctrine of probable cause
"unembarrassed by the special and technical rules of the prize
code." The tribunal rendered an award in favor of the English
claim, but the decision was meager in its reasoning and the tribunal appears to have assumed that it acted according to international law.
The Venezuelan Arbitration cases of 1903 contain some ot
the most elaborate discussions of the meaning and application
of equity. The compromis provided that judgment should be
"on a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections of
a technical nature or of the provisions of local legislation." In
the Aroa Mines case, Umpire Plumley of the British-Venezuelan
Commission adhered to the general principle of international
law that a state is not responsible for the wrongful acts of unsuccessful rebels committed against resident aliens.107 The
Umpire pointed out that the "course of commissions has rarely
strayed from equity and justice by a too close adherence to
technical objections.' 08L In finding the law to govern the case,
the tribunal must first look to its oath, and then to the terms of
the arbitral agreement.-0 9 In case of conflict between the two
the former is the superior rule of action. Although international law is not mentioned in the compromis "since it is a
- Ibid., 103, 104.
21 Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903; Report of Jack~son H. Ralston,

344. "bid., 380.
-*Ibid., 385-6.
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part of the law of the land of both governments, and since it is
the only definitive rule between nations, it is the law of this
tribunal interwoven in every line, word, and syllable of the
protocols, defining their meaning and illuminating the text, restraining', impelling, and directing every act thereunder."
Plunley says: "The phrase 'absolute equity' used in the
protocols the umpire understands and interprets to mean equity
unrestrained by any artificial rules in its application to a given
case." 110 "International law is assumed to conform to justice
and to be inspired by the principles of equity." If, however, international law is opposed to equity, or is inadequate or inapplicable, then the underlying principle of justice and equity enter
into play.11 1 But international law is to be applied as far as
possible, since it has stood the test of time and experience, and
a careless departure would result in entering upon uncharted
seas.
The same issue of law was involved in the Sambiaggio case
before the Umpire Ralston of the Italian-Venezuelan Commis112
It was the Commission, and a similar result was reached.
sion's duty "to apply equitably to the various cases submitted
the well established principles of international law." 113 The
Commission first dealt with the facts "from the standpoint of
abstract right," leaving the analysis of precedents and treaties
to later consideration. The Venezuelan government was not
liable for three equitable reasons: that the revolutionists were
not the agents of the government; that their acts were aimed at
the government, which should not be held liable for the acts of
its enemies seeking its very life; and that they were beyond the
control of the government. Equity will not gonsider political
expediency. 114 Hence the contention that a holding of no responsibility would encourage rebels to seize the property of
foreigners was rejected. The equitable rights of the injured
aliens were held td be inferior to the equitable rights of the
government not to be charged with wrongs it never committed:
a sort of balancing of equities. "In the view of the umpire, the
true interpi'etation of the protocol requires the present tribunal
n° Ebid., 386.

=IbTid, 387.
Ibid., 666.
ITbid., 679-680.
692.
I*!-bid.,
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disregarding technicalities, to apply equitably to the various
cases submitted to them the well-established principles of justice,
not permitting sympathy for suffering to bring about a diregard
for law."
In the Padron case the question of responsibility also came
before the Spanish-Venezuelan Commission, which permitted
the claimants to recover on the ground of equity, the umpire
conceding that ordinarily there was no legal liability.115 The
effect of the "absolute equity" proviso was to make necessary
the separate examination of each claim without its being allowable to lay down an abstract principle stated in general terms,
which would simultaneously decide several claims." 6 In order
to establish that the commission was "created as a tribunal of
equity only," objections of a technical nature and provisions of
local legislation were not to be considered. Umpire GutierrezOtero lays down the rule that the objection of a want of responsibility for the acts of unsuccessful revolutionists is a
technical one because it does not conform to equity. The view
of Merignhac to the effect that such a protocol leaves absolute
7
Absolute
equity to the arbitrator is accepted as correct.11
equity permitted the Commission to decide "without conforming to law, which is what essentially characterizes arbitra.
tors," 118 The protocol shows the desire of the parties to have
the case decided according t6 the principles of morality, and
p'omotes recourse to arbitration since it broadens the scope of
arbitration and permits the decision of a greater variety of
cases.1- 0
-Ibid., 923.
bid., 929.
p. 927. The Umpire also cites the opinion of Lafayette:
"nTh1,
"When it is according to their conscience, sentiments of equity, or the
principles of natural law, that the arbitrators must render their sentence, they constitute a tribunal of equity; if, on the contrary, it is
according to previously established principles of international law, we
have a court of justice." Calvo, InternatiOnalLaw, III, 464, note 1.
itelianee taso is put on the last clause of the recommendation by the
Institute of International LaW in its ruleg Of August, 1875, for use in
arbitration agreements: "The arbitral tribunal shall judge according
to the principles of international law1 ttnless the coftprornis imposes
different rules upon it or leaves its decision to the fr(e opinion of the
arbitrators." Revue de Droit International, 1875, p. 281.
'5

'

Ibid., 928.

"Ibid., 929.
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The same commission laid down the latter rule of responsibility in the Mena case.1 20 The tribunal as one of equity has
absolute liberty to hand down a decision "which is not against
good conscience, inspired by a true estimation of absolute justice,
and which permits finally, taking into consideration of all the
circumstances of the case, conceding equitably what is not a
matter of obligation and cannot be demanded, and, in a word,
proceeding, as arbitrators proceed, that is, without regard for
law.Y
The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague had
occasion to pass on the meaning of equity in the Orinoco Steamship Company case. 121 In revising the award of the United
States-Venezuelan Commission which was empowered to decide according to "absolute equity," the court held that the
protocol "did not vest the arbitrators with discretionary
powers."
The Venezuelan agent used as his "capital argument" the contention that the phrase had conferred unlimited
discretion upon the Commission,' 22 Merignhac, Weiss, and
Fiore were cited as authorities. 23 The United States, on the
other hand, did not quote publicists, but alleged the continued
practice of the United States in using such language in arbitral
agreements without its ever having been construed to give such
authority. 124 The Court reversed the rules laid down in the
award appealed from, that absolute equity authorized the rejection of a claim on the grounds of failure to resort to the local
courts, and of failure of the claimant assignee to notify the
transfer of his debt to the debtor, a proceeding required by the
local law. The arbitral convention of 1903 and 1909 made the
local jurisdiction incompatible with the arbitration. Want of
notice to the debtor was excused on the ground that the rule
requiring it was merely a local one, and hence not required by
absolute equity, especially since the debtor had actual knowledge
of the cession.
One of the most important cases during the last decade
discussing the meaning of equity was the Norwegian Shipping
Claims case against the United States in 1922.125 The award
-OlTbid., 931-932.
2n

Scott, Hague Court Reports, 232.
Venezuelan Argument, 65.

Mdi(., 18, 30, 32.
"'United States Argument,

17 A. 3. 1. L., 362

121, 218, 20.
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lays down a kind of principle of eminent domain in international
law when a state seizes the property of foreign citizens. The
compromis provided for decision according to the "principles
of law and equity." As to the meaning of this phrase the tribunal said: "The majority of international lawyers seem to
agree that these words are to be understood to mean general
principles of justice as distinguished from any particular system
of jurisdiction or the municipal law of any state." 126 They
cannot be understood "in the traditional sense in which these
words are used in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence." Hence the
municipal law of the United States was not binding. It would
not be followed where it violated the principle of equity of the
parties, or the principles of justice common to every civilized
country. The damages and interest appear to have been assessed
on an equitable basis. "It has been somewhat difficult to fix
the real market value of some of these shipbuilding contracts.
The value must be assessed ex aequo et bono." 127 As to interest
the tribunal asserts that it is competent to allow it "as part of
the compensation ex aequo et bono, if the circumstances are considered to justify it. ' 128 The award was accepted by the
United States, but not without serious protest. 129 Secretary
Hughes in a letter to the Norwegian minister at Washington refused to accept what he termed the "apparent bases' of the
award as being expressive of international law or as binding the
United States as a precedent.
The most extensive discussion of equity is to be found in
the recent Cayuga Indians ease decided by the British-American
Claims Commission.13 0 The United States was held liable on a
contract in the form of a treaty made by the State of New York
with the Cayuga Tribe of Indians, part of whom had migrated
to Canada after the making of the treaty. The tribunal expressly stated that the United States was not legally liable for
such a debt, but was equitably liable because the Indians had
no international status and because of their dependent legal
status. The tribunal also held the United States legally liable
under the Treaty of Ghent, so that the finding of equitable
Did., 384.

irbid., 393.
-Ibid, 395.

Ibid, 287-289.
"*Report of Fred KT.2tie~sen, 202-331, 307. Dean Roscoe Pound was
one of the three members deciding the case.
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liability was seemingly unnecessary. "There are cases in
which-like the court of the land-these tribunals must find
the right and the law, in -general considerations of justice,
equity, and right dealing guided by legal analogies and by the
spirit and received principles of international law." 131 Equity
does not involve compromise. 13 2 The ex aequo et bono clause
of article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court is distinguished in its purpose. That clause calls for a "degree of
compromise" and not for principles of equity. EqUity involves
"general and universally admitted principles of justice and
right dealing, as against the harsh operation of strict doctrines
of legal personality-in an anomalous situation for which such
doctrines were not desired and the harsh operation of the legal
terminology of a covenant which the covenantees had no part in
framing and no capacity to understand."
As authority the
tribunal relies on Merignhae, Lammoseh, Bulmerineq, and the
opinion in the Norweigian Shipping Claims case.
In two other cases decided by the same tribunal, composed,
however, of different members, a strict interpretation was placed
on the phrase. In the Hardman case it was held that the United
States was not liable for the destruction of the property of
aliens in time of war in the interest of the preservation of the
health of military forces. 133 An act of grace was, however,
recommended. Both agents urged a limited interpretation of
the word "equity."1 3 4 Hurst, the British agent, contended that
the use of the word "and" instead of "or" to connect "international law" with "equity" showed that equity was to be applied only where there was no rule of international law.135
Clark, the American agent, argued that where there is no applicable rule of strict international law, the tribunal will apply the
following principles in the named order: (1) principles of
private international law; (2) maritime law; (3) "the fundamental principles of the jurisprudence of the various systems
of law, particularly the common law (and, I include in that
term the common law and equity as understood in the United
States and Great Britain) and the principles of the civil law;"
Ibid., 320.
'bid.,

68.

7 A. J. . L , 687-706.

Sbid., 687.
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(4) the fundamental principles of law of the parties involved;
(5) any positive principles of law of the defendant nation, and
(6) any positive principle of law of the plaintiff nation. 13 6
Equity has had a great looseness of usage and interpretation by international tribunals. 131 It is erroneous for them "to
administer abstract equity regardless of the law," and "to try
to conceive what was the abstract equity involved in any particular case." The conception of equity of the individual arbitrator in the case must not govern. The advancement of international arbitration would be impeded by such an interpretation. "If nations come to feel in'submitting differences to the
arbitrators that the decision will probably not be according to
the law involved but will be according to the ideas of the tribunal, as to abstract right and justice, then I say to you arbitration cannot live. No nation would know where an arbitral
tribunal might go in a controversy to which it was a party. 38
In the case of Eastern Extension, Australasia and China
Telegraph Company, Ltd., the tribunal held that a belligerent
nation cutting cables belonging to neutrals and connecting
enemy and neutral Territories was under no equitable obligation
to make compensation. 139 Equity must give way in the face of
a treaty or a rule of international law.' 40 "If the strict application of a treaty or of a specific rule of international law conduce to a decision, which, however justified from a strictly legal
point of view, will result in hardship, unjustified, having regard
to the special circumstances of the case, then it is the duty of the
tribunal to do their best to avoid such a result, so far as may
be possible, by recommending some course of action by way of
grace on the part of the respondent government." The brief of
counsel for the United States cites the Rio Grande, Orinoco, and
14
Santiaggio cases as controlling in the definition of equity. '
Nielson, agent for the United States, asserts that equity as a
ground of decision might well be eliminated, from arbitral comiromis,. but that it has come into a conventional use.' 42 He
-Ibid., 693.

I"bid., 695.
Ilba., 706.
Report of Fred Nielsen, 73.

IbtZ.,
Md 79.
T
h!btd.,
/bi
I
d., 57-59.
60.
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thinks that it "has seldom furnished excuse for an abuse of
judicial discretion, and that the interpretation which has generally been put upon it is that cases are to be decided with impartial, even-handled justice-by the application of law." He
would confine the term to matters specifically designated as
"equities" or "equitable" in the compromis, to the assessment
of damages, and to claims to lands where there is no domestic
law.143 The British agent argued for a wider use of the term
on the ground that international law had not yet reached the
stage of development where all pecuniary claims were regulated
by positive rules of law. 144 The tribunal must therefore have
the power to make awards based on justice in certain cases even
though no positive rules of international law exist. 145
Summarizing the results of the awards of arbitral tribunals, one must conclude that arbitrators have been inclined
to adopt a narrower concept of equity than have the publicists.
International judges have shown a tendency to identify equity
with analogy, as something to be resorted to as a mode of filling
the gaps in international law. The recommendation of acts of
grace and the function of amiable composition have been distinguished from the application of equity. Judges have seldom
ridden rough-shod over well-established rules of international
law. Decisions according to equity have been decisions according to international law, and there has been no addition to substantive international law. It seems wholly unlikely that there
will grow up any body of "equity" apart from international
law. A concise review of the awards plainly demonstrates this.
In the Venezuelan cases of 1903, technical rules of local legislation were rejected. But local rules are not ex proprio vigore
I'bid., 61-62.

- Ibid., 68.

"I Other cases discussing the meaning of equity are: Guastini,
Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903; Report of Jackson H. Ralston, 730;
Kummerow, 526; Turnbull, Manoa Co., Ltd., and Orinoco Co., Ltd., 244;
Gentini, 720; Davis, 402; Mazzei, 693; Brignone, 710; Hreny, Morris'
Report on United States and Venezuelan Claims Commisison, 97; Boulton, Bliss and Dallett, 101; Barberie (also known as Cadiz) 4 Moore,
History and Digest of InternationalArbitrations,4200, 4203; Landreau,
6 A. J. I. L. 1002; Russian Indemnity, Scott Hague Court Reports, 297;
Island of Timor, 354; Pious Fund, 48, 53; Venezuelan Preference, The
Venezuelan Arbitration Before the Hague Tribunal: Report Win. L.
Penfield; Perche, French, American Claims Commission (Boutwells
Report), 41; Lebret, 194; McCalmont, Treaves and Co., Report of the
British-AmericanClaims Comminssion under Treaty of 1853, 341; Lespes,
2 Moore, InternationalArbitrations, 1300, note 2.
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binding in tribunals applying strict international law. The
Aroa Mines and Sambiaggio cases denied the liability of a government for the acts of unsuccessful revolutionists in the absence
of a showing of a lack of due diligence by the government.
This is the ordinary rule of international law. In the Padron
and Mena cases the Spanish-Venezuelan Commission asserted
liability on the ground of equity. When it is borne in mind,
however, that the better constituted commissions found the
other way, and further that the rules of responsibility are not
fully agreed upon at international law, the result is not particularly anomalous. In the Cayuga Indians case the issue of the
liability of the central government on the contracts of a division
or state of the nation was involved. The tribunal expressly
stated that there was no legal liability but held that the United
States was equitably liable. The result is not especially indefensible from the standpoint of international law, as the responsibility in this type of cases is also somewhat unsettled, and
there are several precedents of central governments having been
held liable under not wholly dissimilar circumstances. There
was perhaps a gap in the law which equity might properly :fll
by resort to analogies, which in this case would not be difficult
to find. In the Florida Bonds case the English agent asserted
that the United States was equitably liable for debts contracted
by the territorial government of Florida. Although the arbitral
agreement provided for application of law and equity, the
claim was rejected. Thus it seems that the doctrine of responsibility of a government has not been greatly strethhed by equity.
Although the tribunal accepted the liberal interpretation of
the word "equity" in the Norwegian Shipping Claims case, no
unusual doctrines were laid down. The United States was held
liable for the seizure by the government of Norweigian ships for
war use. But well recognized rules of international law require compensation for such acts. The damages awarded may
have been excessive. It is not clear from anything the Court
said in its opinion, however, that any positive principles qf international law as to damages were violated. The subject of
damages seems at present to be a controverted one. In the
Hardman and the Eastern Extension, Australasia and China
Telegraph Company, Ltd., cases the British-American Tribunal
seems to have adhered to a strict application of international
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law, so that the award in the Cayuga Indians case is quite
fully counterbalanced. In the former case the United States
was held not liable for the destruction of the property of aliens
in time of war with the object of maintaining the health of its
military forces. Yet an act of grace was recommended. In the
latter case the tribunal held that a belligerent cutting cables
belonging to neutrals and connecting enemy and neutral territories was under no equitable obligation to make compensation.
The conclusion seems inevitable that tribunals authorized to
apply equity have adhered rather strictly to rules of international law, and that when they have gone beyond its principles, the departures have not generally been extensive in scope.
C. CONCLUSION AS TO MEAN'IING OF EQUITY.
The views of the leading publicists and the definitions as
found in the leading awards have been set forth. It is now perhaps possible to frame a definition of equity as used in international law, having especially in view compromis which make
equity a ground of decision or associate it with international
law as legal bases. At the outset it is apparent that it is not
identical with the equity of the Anglo-American judicial system.
Nor is it a developed code of law, apart from the rules of international law. It is not an aggregate of substantive and procedural rules., It is not limited to any one field of law, nor
based on historical accident. It is not applied by a separate set
of tribunals, nor is it generally applied consciously by the
regular international judicial bodies apart from international
law. It is improper to speak of arbitration commissions as being
courts of equity, since as has been seen they apply international
law to the same extent as courts of international justice. Nor
is equity identical with principles of private law.
Equity is not the subjective ethical views of the individual
arbitrator. The arbitrator does not examine his individual
conscience to see how he would decide a case apart from rules
of law. Nor is it equivalent to what might be called objective
morality, the morality of popular opinion. It is not identical
with compromise, and is not based on considerations of political
expediency.
What then is equity ? Equity, it appears, is the compound
of legal and semi-legal materials used to fill the gaps in international law. It is based largely on analogy. This analogy is
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to be drawn from legal science or jurisprudence as developed in
close connection with the actually existing and accepted rules
of international law. The scope of equity must not be too
broadly stated. It will not alter positive rules of international
law. Equity is not contrary to international law, but instead
follows it to the extent of its existence. The theory is that international law is based in part at least on consent, and this
would no longer be true if the tribunal could alter the rules.
But while equity may not modify positive rules, it may fill the
gaps in international law. International law is not regarded as
a completely developed legal system, as are the private law
systems of the leading nations of the world. As to many subjects of international relations there is no law at all. On other
questions the law is but slightly developed or is very uncertain
and obscure. It is the task of equity to make liossible solution
of such questions. Equity will make use of the existing rules
of law and out of them will seek to draw further principles. It
will resort to anal6gies. But in the use of analogies it will be
careful not to stride too rapidly. Analogies will be based on
closely related categories and not on unrelated fields of the law.
As Mr. Justice Holmes says: "I recognize without hesitation
that judges do and must legislate .but they can only do so
interstitially, they are confined from molar to molecular
motions. "1146

In one aspect equity in international law means morality.
But it is a morality in close contact with existing rules of law.
It is not simply a matter of generosity and sympathy and
mercy. In selecting analogies and the other legal data to fill the
gaps judges will inevitably be affected by ethical concepts. But
the ethics will be those of a lawyer trained in the various fields
of law and their bearing on one another, that is, the judg will
not allow considerations of morality to so dominate as violently
to upset the qualities of certainty and predictability in the law.
In one sense it may be said that equity is a mode of application of the law rather than a source of law itself. ' That is, the
147
international tribunal will apply international law equitably.
"'SSout£ern Pacific CJo. v. ;ensen (1917), 244 U, S. 205, ".........
' The arbitrator "should take account of equity, of the ideas of
morality and justice which are found at the basis of intgraational law,
in the interpretation which he believes should be giveii to the principles of this law." Weiss, Revue Generale de droit internationalpubH~e (1910), 121.
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Equity is a quality which pervades or should pervade the whole
field of international law. Therefore to shut it off into a separate compartment is somewhat misleading.
Six or seven different meanings have been given to the word
equity as a general term of jurisprudence. It has been thought
to mean simply analogy. It has been also identified with interpretation. Historically as far back as Aristotle it has been defined as reasonable modification of the letter of the law,
especially of statutory law. In a somewhat broader sense it has
been used as a synonym of reasonableness or fairness in general.
Thus it might modify both statutes and case law. In a fifth
sense it has been used as equivalent to morality. In this sense
it may mean the objective morality of public opinion or the subjective conscientious views of the judge. Occasionally it has
been used in the same sense as public utility. A few writers reduce it to a mere compromise based on expediency. In international law it would seem that equity may include the ideas
of analogy, interpretation, reasonable modification of treaties,
and reasonableness in general as to the application of both
customary and treaty law. When the application of these still
leave some doubt the tribunal may resort to morality. This
morality will likely be the ethical views of the judges themselves, as there is no mode of measuring objective public
morality. Considerations of public utility and compromise
would seem to be excluded except as they coincided with
morality.
Finally in connection with the whole subject of equity in
international law, one last word of skepticism seems necessary.
Even when the arbitrator is empowered to decide simply according to international law, it seems that he is not barred from resort to analogy and to considerations of reasonableness and
morality. The international judicial process is not so utterly
unlike the process of a national court that the tribunal is to be
denied all creative functions. 148 An examination of inter"s"Moreover, it is not seen why, equity, which constitutes one of
the bases of the positive municipal law of nations, should not also constitute one of the bases of international law, and be taken into consideration In a reasonable manner in the application of this latter law.
Especially since in one of its acceptations, the law of nations is taken
as synonymous with natural law, consecrating the principles of morality and justice accepted by all peoples and opposing itself to the positive law of the various states." Merignhac, L'Arbitrage International,
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national awards shows that international law has been developed
to a certain extent through them. Arbitral tribunals have proceeded to fill the gaps in international law, although the compromis have made no mention of equity. The judicial process
of international tribunals is very similar irrespective of the
terms of the compromis. The tribunal regards itself as bound
to apply international law even if the arbitral agreement goe,%
so far as to make "absolute equity" a basis, and even amiable
cornpositeurs have been known to declare themselves bound by
international law. It is doubtless true that an award may be
regarded as invalid on account of an excess of power in not following the legal bases set out in the compromis. 149 But such
procedure is comparatively so rare as hardly to merit consideration. 5o Where a nation fails to protest at once, the excess must
be regarded as waived. The search and use of the sources by
the tribunal is not a highly conscious process. Too often it is
merely a disappointed agent who attacks the juridical character
of the award. It is much to be doubted whether nations have
attached much importance to the precise wording of the legal
grounds of decision. In fact private law judges in most nations
I

sec. 298. For analysis of the judicial process in municipal law courts,
see Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process; Gray, Nature and
Sources of the Law.
11In 1877 the Institute of International Law suggested four
1
grounds for the nullity of an award: nullity of the compromis, excess
of power, fraud of the arbitrators, and essential error. Annuaire de
l'Institut de droit International,I, 1877, p. 133. A failure to follow the
grounds of decision set out in the compromis is regarded as excess of
power and possibly essential error. Lammasch, who has made a careful study of the subject, approves of only -two grounds for nullity, excess of power and fraud of the arbitrators.
Die Lehre oton der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem ganzem Urn,
fange, II, 221-222. Thus a failure to follow the prescribed legal bases
would be a ground of nullity under his view also. Perhaps the leading
examples of awards Which were regarded as invalid for such a failure
was that in 1827 of the King of Netherlands as to the Maine Boundary and that in the original Orinoco Shipping Company case. In the
former the award drew an intermediate boundary line based on compromise. In the latter the award was set aside by theHague Tribunal
for a failure to decide according to "absolute equity," as the compromis
had prescribed.
1' Weiss asserts that the sanction of nullity of an award applies
particularly -to a failure to follow the legal grounds set out in the compromis, and that where equity is but one basis, especially a subsidiary
basis according to the compromis, the award is assailable. Revue Generale de droit internationalpublic, 120-126. But Merignhac points out
that even cases of the' larger category-excess of power-have been
very rare, and that the objection is more theoretical than practical.
L'Arbitrage International,see. 331.
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are not formally bound to apply the law in any certain mode or
in any certain order as to legal categories, and yet the results
arrived at are generally satisfactory. It would seem improper
therefore unduly to emphasize the significance or the formal
sources of law set out in the arbitral agreements. The supremacy of international law seems to be assured in most all cases
no matter what language is used.

V. GAPs iN

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

One of the most mystifying problems of international law
is the existence of what are called "gaps" in the law.15 1 That
such lacwnae exist is tacitly and often expressly recognized by
publicists. The compromis of arbitral agreements very seldom
provide for decisions according to international law exclusively,
but generally provide for resort to other sources of law, such
as the principles of municipal law, the decisions of international
and national tribunals, the opinions of authoritative writers,
and principles of equity and justice. While the purpose of such
provisions is perhaps in some instances to prevent a decision
according to strict principles of international law, and may in
other cases represent mere redundancy of legal language, there
can be no doubt that on many occasions the parties have stipulated to such effect in order to avoid a non liquet, that is, a refusal of the tribunal to decide the case on account of the inadequacy or obscurity of the law. Article 37 of the Hague Convention providing for awards by the Hague Tribunal "on the
basis of respect for law" instead of simply "on the basis of
law" indicates that the framers viewea international law as an
incomplete system. The Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice manifestly had this in mind when they
prescrfbed in Article 38 the following material law to be applied
by the Permanent Court:
"1. International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
"2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
"3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
"4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
SThe German term for gap is
"lacune," and Latin, "lacuna."

"lucke,"

French and Italian,
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"This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide
a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto."

The recent United States-British Arbitration Tribunal
seems to have had gaps in view when they said that "even assuming that there was . . . . no treaty and no specific rule
of international law formulated as the expression of a universally recognized rule governing the case . . .
it cannot
be said that there is no principle of international law applicable.
International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain,
and generally does not contain, express rules decisive of particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the
conflict of opposing rights and interests by applying, in default
of any specific provision of law, the corollaries of general principles." 1r2
Kantorowicz, writing of the problem of gaps in any legal
system points out that the word may be given an exceedingly
broad meaning. 53 "The fact that the construction of a statutory rule or the interpretation of a judicial opinion is dubious,
is a proof that a logically stringent decision is impossible; and
the assertion that the case before the court is 'similar' to a certain precedent, generally implies a subjective evaluation that
the differences between the two cases are insignificant and an admission that there is no established rule governing the ease in
question in its full individuality. So the lawyer is, in fact, always faced with the 'gaps' in the law and this demonstrates the
importance of the gap problem."
There are, in the view of Kantorwicz, two opposing tendencies in the law; the formalistic, which applies the law exactly
as it has developed historically; and the purposive or productive, which has prevailed in the Anglo-American legal system
in practice though not in theory, and which uses the law as a
154
means to the end of controlling life in its shifting facts.
The former school adopts the Geschlossenheitstheorie, that law
is a closed system free of gaps. The latter school should regard
formal law as subject to gaps (the Luckentheorie). The theory
of the Anglo-American legal system has been obscured, however,
because the lawyers have "considered law as a closed system
'"Nielsen's Report, 73, Eastern Extension,
Telegraph Co., Ltd.
28 Columbia Law Review, 679, 698-699.
I Tbid., 699-701.

Australasia and China
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and therefore believed that they had to disguise their own
juristic and judicial creations as mere applications of the law."'
Gaps are of two types: material, where the rule of law itself is
lacking; and, textual, where only an adequate textual expression
of the purpose of the law is laeking. 155 The textual gaps, or as
Zitelmaun calls them, the "apparent" gaps are caused by the
fact that the purpose of the statute is broader than its meaning,
as where the word "man" is used to include both men and
women. The textual gaps must be filled by "free interpretation," based on the purpose of the statute, as tested by its social
effect if it were adopted at the time of the controversy.
"Material" gaps exist both in code and case-law systems.' 5 6
"The material gaps have to be filled up by different forms of
the free law, the order of which is determined in part by positive
rules, in part by considerations of legal philosophy." Article
I of the Swiss Code lays down a specific order. In the absence of
positive rules the following order is suggested: formal explicit
law, formal implicit law, nascent explicit law, nascent implicit
law, desired explicit law, and desired implicit law. Three important mistakes in filling the gaps are suggested. 157 In the
first place the court may apply "one alone out of several equally
possible interpretations as the only one to fill up the gap." In
the second place, it may act "in pretended accordance with the
whole system, but without regard to the peculiarity of the problem or case in question." Thirdly, it may err "by an unsuitable
transference of a concept from a technically well developed
branch to a less developed one. In the first instance we have
the systematical, in the second the pseudo-systematical, in the
third the cross-selective (grenzverwirrende) type of legal conceptualism."
Kiss also ascribes a broad meaning of the term as one of
jurisprudence.158 He asserts that "the specific facts in individual cases produce 'gaps' in every legislative provision. "u 5
Gaps are not limited to technical errors in drafting statutes,
obvious mistakes on the part of the legislator, or important
-Ibid., 701-702.
Ibid., 705-706.

'

7 cience of Legal Method, 146, 158-162, "Equity and Law: Judicial

Freedom of Decision, 146, 158-162.
'-'

Ibid., 159.

Ibid., 160.
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changes in economical and social conditions. It "is not possible
to draw a sharp distinction between statutes that provide for
all cases and those that contain 'gaps'. The line is altogether
vague." 160 The general framework of the statute is to be filled
in by interpretation, that is, by carrying out the principles of
the statute.'0 1 The court is to supply what the statutes omit,
but always through interpretation. In the case of statutes there
are 'gaps' in a narrow and technical sense when there is a lack
of detailed, abstract rules by which a submitted case may be
decided. In the view of Kiss it seems that gaps are confined to
statutory law.
The views of the two writers as just stated are from the
point of view of law in general. One of the most recent considerations from the point of view of international law is that
of Verdross.'0 2 The expression "gap in the law" is ambiguous
Ibid., 161-162.
""Die Verlassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft, sec. 19, pp. 69-75.
""Ibid, 72. Most of the publicists seem inclined -to reject the possibility of a non liquet in international law. By the term seems to be
meant a refusal of a court to decide a case on account of the obscurity

or inadequacy of the law. Article 4 of the French Civil Code, requires

the national courts to decide in all cases. The subject was discussed by
the Advisory Committee of Jurists which drew up the World Court
Statute. Hagerup was of the view that to avoid the possibility of a
non liquet, the court must not be allowed to dismiss the case, for want

of a material applicable rule. Hence, he favored the joint Scandi-

navian project submitted to the Committee allowing the court to resort
to general principles of law and even to decide according to what it

thought ought to be the law. Advisory Committee of Jurists, Perma-

Root innent Court of InternationalJustice, Proces Verbeaux, 286.
sisted that if the court were given compulsory jurisdiction, in cases
where there was no applicable law, it should dismiss' the case, or con-

fine itself to making a recommendation. If the court's jurisdiction was
to be voluntary, however, he had no objection to the application of subjective conceptions of justice in such cases. Ibid., 308-323. Descamps
denied that the absence of treaty or customary law meant that the

court could not decide. Loder pointed out that the Dutch law did not
permit a non liquet, and that the same principle could apply in international law. De Lapradelle, like Loder, could not conceive- of a non
liquet. Ricci-Busatti defended Root's position, urging that what is not
forbidden is allowed. Hence, if a claimant state can point to no legal
rule in its favor, the court need simply declare the absence of a material applicable rule and thereby establish the legal situation. Hagerup
was willing to accept this position if the English system of judge-made
law were taken over, so that the court might resort to analogies and
precedents. Lord Phillimore pointed out that in private cases where
the plaintiff had merely a right of a moral order, the case must be dismissed in the absence of positive law in support of his claim. The gaps

in international law should be filled through legislation by the Assembly of the League, or by reference of the dispute to the Council. He
asserted that Root's view based on the Anglo-American demurrer.
On the whole, it seems best to conclude that an international court can-
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and equivocal. In a broad sense it may mean that international
law does not fulfill the needs of international society. But to
regard international law as wanting in this respect, one must
have in mind an ideal law of which existing law is only a part.
But this, in the view of Verdross, is only a "political" gap.
In the second place, by the existence of gaps in international law
may be meant that not all international disputes may be settled
by reference to international law. In the third place it may mean
that a non liquet has been provided for. As to the second meaning suggested, Verdross points oat that not all cases can be
solved on the basis of the immediately applicable rules, and
that a partial resort to analogy is necessary. If we call such
gaps "legal" gaps, the modern penal code is free from these
gaps, since in accord with the maxim nulum crimen sine lege
an analogous carrying over of the criminal facts is excluded,
so that each case on the basis of these rules must lead to a sentence or an acquittal. The modern civil codes have "legal"
gaps, however, since in some cases an analogous application of
their directly applicable rules is necessary. But this hiatus is
not based on a defect in the legal system, but rather on its fullness, and it is the design of the legal system to refer the
judge to analogy. That is, the judge resorts to analogy not because the case could not otherwise be decided, but because the
law desires in certain cases not a strict but an analogous appliation of the directly applicable rules.
In fact if the legal
system failed to direct any resort to analogy, all legal claims not
founded on the applicable rules would be rejected, so that no
legal gaps would exist. The "legal" gap is thus created in the
first instance by the design of the legal system not to place all
cases under the directly applicable rules, but to make use of
statutory and legal analogy when a strict application of these
rules would violate the spirit of the legal system.
The third possible meaning above mentioned is that the
not dismiss a case on account of the obscurity of the law, as it is the
function of a court to resolve the obscurity. Even when the law is
clear but inadequate, it would seem that the technical rules of demurrer would not apply in international cases. On the other hand, the
mere resort by a claimant state to adjudication is not in itself evidence
that it has a valid claim. The decision of the Permanent Court of Iuternational Justice in the Lotus case seems to indicate that a nation
must be able to point to some established principle to support its claim.
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judge is not in position to decide certain cases, so that the controversy has to suspend with a non liquet.168 Such a gap
is termed by Verdoss an "application" gap. Such a gap may
arise out of the nature of the legal system, as when the judge is
directed not to decide under all circumstances, but under fixed
hypotheses to pronounce a non liquet, and to leave the decision
to another as the law giver. Hence these "application" gaps
form no gaps in the legal system. They arise not because the
judge cannot decide the case, but because it is the design of the
legal system that it shall not be resolved by him. Such a case
arises in international law when an arbitral agreement on the
one hand empowers the tribunal to decide on the basis of settled rules, and on the other hand expressly or tacitly forbids the
rejection of those claims which cannot be founded on these
principles. 164 In such cases the settlement is left to the
mutual understanding of the parties. Real "application" gaps
exist when the law contains a principle governing the case at
issue, but such principle is too uncertain to be capable of application to the extent that the legal system furnishes no authority
to resort to analogy or free discretion. "Since in this case, a
technical flaw in the legal order is involved, these 'application'
gaps may be called 'technical' gaps."
A legal system may intentionally exclude certain cases.
Thus from this point of view the legal system contains gaps only
to the extent that it wishes to do so. Such gaps are not unwilled
gaps. No matter how incomplete the legal system viewed from
this apart, a decision is always possible, all claims not founded
on principles of law, not being recognized as existing in law.
The theoretical controversy depends on whether the legal system asserts the claim to regulate all cases, or whether it undertakes not to lay down principles for certain cases. Under the
former state of facts the legal system is, aside from the technical gaps, free from gaps despite all its deficiencies. But even
under the latter assumption, the gaps are not clefts in the legal
system, but only a figurative expression for the subjects not encompassed within the area of rules of law. Disputes over the
issues could be settled by the application of international law,
Ibid., 72-73.
2 A. J. L L. 313, 335, "The Science of International Law: Its

Task and Method."
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but the parties have forbidden it. The "rechtsleere Raum"
does not emerge until the. parties have limited themselves. In
cases before the World Court the third clause of Article 38 will
provide for "technical" and "legal" gaps.
Oppenheim assumes the existence of gaps in international
law, but is not explicit as to what is their nature. 165 "It is not
the task of the writer to fill in the gaps in the existing rules of
international law unless a conclusion per analogiam suggests
itself with such force that its acceptance is obvious and absolutely necessary. Of course, the gaps must be brought into view,
and the writer may offer an opinion de lege ferenda, how to fill
them in." The English common law judges fill in gaps in Municipal law with case law. "Do they not fill in the gaps of the law
with new law which they find per analogiam?" 160
Lammasch, in his excellent analysis of the arbitral process,
has studied the problem of gaps and the methods of filling
them.16 7 His concept is much like the "legal" and "technical"
gaps referred to by Verdross. "In many cases a completely applicable and indisputable legal basis for the legal conception of
the arbitral tribunal will be lacking. Positive international law
has not been developed for a very long time; hence in some cases
it can give to questions which come up only a partly certain
answer. The gaps in international law are all too many.''108
Under such a state of facts the arbitral tribunal may not apply
the local law of one of the parties- unless both parties agree
thereto. Just as the arbitrator must apply international law
when a rule exists, so in the case of a gap, he may not fill it according to his individual legal conviction. He should apply
rules in the spirit of existing international law. It is the task
of jurisprudence to develop the rules where gaps exist. But
such jurisprudence is not to act on the mere personal opinion of
jurists, but on a legal science operating in close unity with positive law. In such cases, in which positive rules of international
law are lacking, it is legal analogy, and scientific development
-&Ibid.,Rechtskraft
337.
Internationa~er Schiedsspruohe, 43-48.
.lrDie
1Ibid,, 43-44.
" Ibid.; 47.
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which must form the basis of the award." 169 This in the view
170
of Lammaseh is what is meant by a resort to equity.
Alvarez suggests that there 're three kinds of gaps in international law.17 1 The simplest type is of a case which has
not been foreseen, but of a nature identical or similar to that of
other cases which have been foreseen. Such a gap is to be filled
by the application of general principles of law, especially by
resort to analogy. But caution must be used in applying private
law analogies. The second sort of gaps is "a wholly new case
involving the appearance of a new relation due to social and
economic changes." To fill this gap reedurse must be had "to
the principles of law, and in their absence to those of justice and
equity, the solution most conformable to their nature must
be found according to these later principles: otherwise, the development of the law would be impeded." The third type of
gap is a case arising out of "the special situation of a continent
and which has not been foreseen." That is, there might be a gap
in international law as relates to South America. This gap is to
be filled like the second type.
Enrich has also given some attention to the problem of
gaps. 172 He contends that on account of the incompleteness and
gaps in international law, arbitrators cannot decide wholly according to strict law. "An international arbitral tribunal to be
sure cannot decide contrary to recognized principles of international law, but when the present materials of development of
international law and its numerous gaps are brought in view,
the claim cannot be unopposedly maintained that the decisions
of international arbitral tribunals must be based exclusively on
jus stricturn. 173 Writing before the Permanent Court of International Justice was established, Enrich maintains that a world
court should have the right to decide according to justice and
equity, because under present world conditions it is impossible
to have such a court decide only according to "recognized rules
of international law.' 74 He seems to be of the view that a gap
SIbid., 48.
oLa Oodification Du- Droit International, 162-164.
27Problemn der internationalen Organisation,3-9.
Ir
bid., 3-4.
lUIbid.,
5.
47

I bid., 7.
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is a considerably broader hiatus in the law than a mere defect
which can be cured by a resort to analogy. The international
judge exercises two functions: finding the law and the use of
free discretion (das freie Ermessen).175 The problem of free
discretion of the judge is closely connected with that of finding
the law. "The discretion of the judge which here has a wide
field to act in and which often will be of decisive significance
cannot be unquestionably identified with his 'law-finding' function in connection with questions of the kind mentioned here;
in the first place it is less a matter of filling the gaps in the
law, than ascertaining the facts and applying the right consid6
eration to them.''17
When all is said and done, it seems that the problem of
gaps in international law is not wholly dissimilar from that in
private law. If it be asserted that the failure of international
law to meet the needs of international relations proves that it
contains gaps, manifestly gaps must be said to exist in private
law since there is no one who concedes that the legal system of
any country fully meets its needs. The common law is constantly being altered by judicial decisions while the Continental
codes acquire new meaning through interpretation and the passage of new laws. The existence of political questions in international law does not necessarily indicate that there are lacunae
in the law, inasmuch as it is the deliberate will of the nations
themselves that certain questions be regarded as political. It is
submitted that practically every dispute that might arise can be
settled according to legal principles if the parties actually desire
a legal adjustment. While it is true that international law is
-'I bid., 9.
170The

following are suggested as a bibliography on the gaps in international law: Alvarez, La Codification Du Droit International
(1912), 162-164; Cavaglieri, Lo stato di necessita nel diritto internazionale (1918) 104-118; Donati, I Vroblema delle 7acune dell' ordinamento giuridico, (1910); Ehrlich, Lucken im Recht; Erich, Probeme
der internationalen Organisation, (1914), 1-10; Heilborn, Grundbegriffe,
33 et seq.; Kantorowicz, 28 Columbia Law Review 679, 699-706, (1928);
Kiss, Science of Legal Method, 158-162, "Equity and Law: Judicial
Freedom of Decision;" Lammasch, Die Rechtskraft Internationaler
Bchiedsspruche, 43-48; Oppenheim, 2 A. J.I. L. 313 (1908), "The Science
of International Law: Its Task and Method;" Redslob, Das Problem des
Volcerrechts, (1917) 241, 315 et seq.; Somlo, #tfristischeGrundehre
(1917); Strisower, Die Krieg und die Volkerrecht, 62 et seq.; Trendelenburg, Lucken im Volkerrecht, (1870); Verdross, Die Verfassung der
Vo lkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), see. 19; Zitelmann, Lucaen imr Recht
(1903); Zitelmann, Die Unvoflkommenheit des Volkerrechts, (1919).
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in its infancy, yet the armory of legal norms is full enough to
make possible the adjudication of most controversies according
to law. It is moreover a notable fact that even well developed
private law systems such as that of the United States, have their
categories of political questions of which the national courts
cannot take jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of the United
States leaves to the political department such questions as the
existence within a state of the Union of a republican form of
government, and the recognition of foreign states. If the two
defects suggested, that of the failure of international law fully
to meet the needs of the family of nations, and of the existence
of political questions be considered as gaps, it seems that they
must be filled in by international legislation, and not by judicial
decision.
A gap in the legal sense, one must conclude is the nonexistence or the obscurity of detailed rules for the settlement of
concrete cases. The international jurist must become conscious
of such gaps, not, however, by resort to his individual subjective
attitude towards a given problem of international relations, but
by bringing to bear his trained legal point of view, so as to
become aware that the problem admits of solution by resort to
analogy and interpretation. Otherwise there would be chaos in
world adjudication, since a claimant nation would readily find
a gap in the law, based on its desire for relief. Gaps of this
kind may exist both in treaties and in customary law. The international tribunal has the right to bring about a solution by
a resort to analogy. That is, it may look to the existing legal
principles which in logic and reason seem more directly to bear
on the problem and draw from them a new rule. Perhaps several analogies will occur to the tribunal, and at this stage the
court will be led to examine considerations of equity. This examination will result in the courts having to consider questions
of reasonableness and morality and international sociology.
Thus even at this date natural law with, however, a changing
content may still play a part in the law of nations. It may be
that because of the inequality in the strength of the different
nations and because of the infancy of international law that
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considerations of morahty operate within a more limited scope
in international adjudication, but that equity must still play a
part cannot successfully be denied.
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